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The Hungarian study is part of a research conducted within the SPINTAN pro-
ject (http://www.spintan.net/about-spintan/) on the impact of OC on hospital perfor-
mance in three countries: Germany, Hungary, and England. The research teams in 
each country have attempted to use as much as possible a common methodology for 
both data definitions and statistical techniques. Investments in own-account OC are 
defined by them in terms of expenditures on personnel who generated this asset. 
Hospital performance is measured as an index of overall output based on activities 
undertaken by general (rather than specialised) hospitals; and the hospital production 
function is estimated including inputs and a number of common control variables.  
In the study, the term “organisational capital” is used as adopted in the main-
stream literature. OC is widely acknowledged as an important part of firm-specific 
knowledge assets, a great part of which is own account, produced by the employees. 
Investment in own-account OC could be measured by the compensation of employ-
ees in proportion to their working time spent on creating OC. According to the 
CHS approach (Corrado–Hulten–Sichel [2005], [2009]), only managers and other 
executives are engaged in generating OC, and 20% of their working time (valued by 
the compensation received) is used for this purpose. In the study of the OECD Direc-
torate for Science, Technology and Industry (Squicciarini–Le Mouel [2012]), a 
broader concept is suggested according to which employees in several non-
managerial positions may also contribute – to varying degrees – to producing OC.  
As it is widely cited, OC as an enterprise-specific intangible asset extends the 
production possibilities of the enterprise. In health care, it means that hospitals own-
ing more OC than others can provide – with the same inputs – a higher volume of 
health services. OC is a special kind of intangible asset in the sense that it is not mar-
ketable. Some of its components can be acquired on the market, for example, in the 
form of employee training, but their majority is produced by the enterprise. As OC is 
firm specific, it does not have a separate market value; its value is imbedded in the 
value of the enterprise as a whole and can be estimated only by costs and expenditure 
on its acquisition. 
The production of own-account OC is a secondary activity of the enterprise, 
which is presently not included in the macroeconomic aggregates. It is assumed that 
it is an activity without any capital and intermediate inputs, and the value of its out-
put is equal to the payments to the employees engaged in the creation of OC. On the 
current accounts, one should make estimates on the creation of such assets both as a 
secondary productive activity of the enterprise concerned and as an investment on 
the use side. To measure the impact of OC on performance, the volume of its stocks 
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should be estimated. It is widely assumed that changes in the capital input are pro-
portional to changes of stocks in constant prices when a geometric depreciation pro-
file is applied. To estimate the value of stocks of assets with a PIM (Perpetual Inven-
tory Model), long-term investment series are required, and one should make assump-
tions about the life cycle of the assets.  
1. Data sources to measure OC and its impact 
The hospital-level micro dataset of this analysis is compiled from various 
sources. In Hungary, there are abundant data at hospital level, collected for different 
purposes by various government agencies. Compilation of (especially economic) 
statistics is, in most cases, only a secondary way of using available data. Therefore, 
their contents and classifications are not tailored to the statistical needs. In addition, 
not all data collected are used regularly for administrative purposes, so a considera-
ble number of primary data are not checked and corrected properly. 
The main characteristics of inpatient care facilities financed by NHIF (National 
Health Insurance Fund) are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Characteristics of inpatient care facilities (financed by NHIF) in Hungary, 2003, 2005, 2010, and 2013 
Characteristic 2003 2005 2010 2013 
Number of service providers 180 184 178 172 
Number of hospital beds  79 715 79 394 71 183 68 995 
Number of hospital beds per 10 000 of population 78.7 78.7 71.2 69.7 
Number  of patients discharged (thousand)  2 749 2 800 2 458 2 385 
Number of nursing days (million) 23.1 22.7 19.9 19.1 
Occupancy rate of beds (%) 79.41 78.48 76.44 75.79 
Average length of stay (days) 8.36 8.09 8.06 7.90 
Mortality rate (%) 2.86 2.81 3.23 3.36 
Note. There are also some small size inpatient facilities (e.g. in cosmetic surgery) that are not financed by 
NHIF. 
Source: HCSO and NHIF statistics. 
As Table 2 shows, the vast majority of inpatient care facilities are owned by the 
government. 
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Table 2 
Inpatient care facilities by type of owner and by characteristics, 2012  
Type of owner 
Characteristic 
Number of 
inpatient care 
facilities 
Number of 
hospital beds 
Number of 
patients 
discharged 
(thousand) 
Occupancy 
rate of beds 
(%) 
Average 
length of stay 
(days) 
Mortality rate 
(%) 
Total 174 68 440 2 366.2 74.74 7.98 3.41 
of which:        
Central government   102 54 475 1 800.6 74.17 8.29 3.70 
Local government 12 83 7.5 108.32 4.17 0.25 
University 4 7 363 375.3 72.3 5.17 1.95 
Church 9 1 437 28.5 74.53 13.8 4.71 
Other (private) company 47 5 082 154.3 82.00 9.81 3.53 
Source: HCSO and NHIF statistics. 
To make a comparison, government-owned general hospitals are selected from all 
inpatient care facilities. General hospitals are such inpatient care facilities that have 
at least a department of surgery, gynaecology and general internal medicines. It 
should be noted that the selected hospitals do no constitute a random sample. They 
cover the total population of those general inpatient care providers whose all input 
data needed for the model are available and whose output can be measured by DRGs. 
The Hungarian database consists of 58 general hospitals that were functioning in 
the whole period of 2010–2013. The database has been compiled from the following 
data sources:  
Annual financial reports of budget institutions submitted to the State Treasury. As 
these very detailed reports are uniform and are prepared not just by health care pro-
viders but by all budget units, sometimes it is not clear what is the content of some of 
the categories used in the questionnaires, in the context of health care provision. (For 
instance, the questionnaire classifies positions in health sector such as standard posts 
in public administration, which are less relevant in health care provision.) Annual 
financial reports serve as a source not only for most of our input data but also for the 
production account of general government sector in the national accounts. 
Statistical tables presented on the website of NHIF. They provide information, for 
example, on the size of hospitals (number of beds) as well as on the main composi-
tion and financing of their services. The sources of these tables are statistical reports 
on hospital beds and patient turnover and monthly reports prepared by the hospitals 
for NHIF on their inpatient care performance. 
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Data on activities by DRGs at hospital level received from NHIF. This source 
contains data on the number of cases, sum of DRG points, length of nursing days, 
mortality rate, etc.  
Statistical data collected by the State Secretariat for Healthcare of the Ministry of 
Human Resources on employment and wages in the health sector and presented on 
its website. 
Various statistical surveys conducted by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
to substitute missing values.  
According to Hungarian legislation, all these data on hospitals are public.  
Tables 3 and 4 compare the main characteristics of Hungarian inpatient care facil-
ities (financed by NHIF) with those of the selected hospitals. As the figures demon-
strate, the hospitals included in our analysis cover about two thirds of all inpatient 
care facilities.  
Table 3 
Number of active beds in inpatient care facilities, 2010–2013 
Year 
Number of beds  
in total active care 
Number of beds  
in the active care of the 
selected hospitals 
Selected / total (%) 
2010 44 179 31 878 72.2 
2011 44 137 31 894 72.3 
2012 42 211 31 006 73.5 
2013 42 258 32 018 75.8 
Source: NHIF. 
Table 4 
Number of DRG cases and sum of DRG points, 2010–2013 
Year 
Number of DRG cases  Sum of DRG points 
in total active 
care (thousand) 
in the active care 
of the selected 
hospitals (thou-
sand) 
Selected / total 
(%) 
in total active 
care (thousand) 
in the active care 
of the selected 
hospitals (thou-
sand) 
Selected / total 
(%) 
2010 2 179.3 1 506.6 69.1 2 266.1 1 455.2 64.2 
2011 2 210.9 1 530.9 69.2 2 314.3 1 485.3 64.2 
2012 2 191.1 1 547.0 70.6 2 191.1 1 503.0 68.6 
2013 2 199.0 1 602.6 72.9 2 319.8 1 565.6 67.5 
Source: NHIF. 
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To measure investment in own-account OC, data on employment and salaries by 
responsibility and position are required. The Hungarian data sources provide an op-
portunity to measure own-account OC both in a narrow and in a broad sense:  
1. In the financial reports of budget units, the position of an employee is classi-
fied by three dimensions: 
– level of education (primary, secondary, tertiary) needed to hold 
the position,  
– category of the position (whether it is a managerial/executive or a 
non-managerial position), 
– type of duties of the position (principal, auxiliary, ancillary) with-
in organisation. 
It is worth noting that each budget unit has to report its employment figures in the 
same structure. This may facilitate the measurement of OC in other government ac-
tivities as well. 
2. The State Secretariat for Healthcare of the Ministry of Human Resources con-
ducts annually a full-scope employment survey on all inpatient health care institutions. 
In the questionnaire, medical doctors, other professional staff and the other employed 
are distinguished and the number of the employed and wages are inquired about.  
Employment figures are collected in head counts. The difference between these fig-
ures and their full-time equivalents in inpatient care of Hungary may not be significant. 
2. Measuring OC 
The study measures own-account OC following two different approaches. Ac-
cording to the narrow title-based approach, it is assumed that only employees hold-
ing executive/managerial positions produce OC, whereas the premise behind the 
broad task-based approach is that organisational capabilities are not limited to man-
agers. All employees may perform tasks by which OC is created to varying degrees, 
depending on the content of the task. To provide comparable and plausible size of 
the investment in and stocks of OC in the two approaches, it is assumed that if more 
employees are able to create OC, they will spend less time on doing it (mainly in 
parallel with the provision of health care).  
In the title-based approach (see also O’Mahony–Beghelli–Stokes [2016]), the 
CHS concept is strictly applied, and investment in own-account OC is measured as 
20% of the compensation of managers, presuming that the same proportion of their 
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working time is spent on management responsibilities. This concept distinguishes 
leading clinical professionals and general managers. In the task-based approach, by 
contrast, we make an assumption that doctors spend 9%, other health professionals 
6% of their working time on creating OC. In some calculations, other employees 
have been included as well, supposing that they spend 2% of their working time on 
producing OC. These ratios are similar to the ones applied by Schulz–Beckmann 
[2016] in the German case study of the SPINTAN project.  
In 2013, on average, 5% of the staff was employed in managerial/executive po-
sitions in the Hungarian inpatient care facilities; the corresponding figure for the 
selected hospitals was about 4.5%. These proportions refer to the hospitals as a 
whole, the number of managers and clinical executives in active care were not 
reported separately. 
Table 5  
Number of employees in the selected hospitals, 2010–2013 
(title-based approach) 
Employee 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Clinical executive 2 217 2 256 2 314 2 359 
General manager 533 560 580 582 
Other employee 60 651 61 493 61 672 66 264 
Total 63 401 64 309 64 566 69 205 
Source: Reports to the State Treasury.  
In the selected hospitals, the percentage of doctors was 14.3% in the total number 
of employees in 2013, while the number of the qualified staff accounted for 51%. 
Table 6 presents the relevant numbers and proportions. 
To estimate OC stocks, a simplified PIM has been applied. We estimated several 
versions with different depreciation rates that depend on the number of years during 
which the person creating OC is employed in the same hospital. The core estimates 
apply a depreciation rate of 40% for general managers and 30% for clinical execu-
tives. As far as the leading clinical professionals in Hungary are concerned, the latter 
rate may be too high if the frequency of voluntary separation is taken into account. 
Investment time series in constant prices were calculated following the changes in 
the number of employees creating OC and the changes in their real wages (deflated 
by the GDP deflator). To estimate an opening stock at the beginning of 2010, the 
investment series were back-casted, assuming that in each hospital the average 
growth rate of OC in the 2010–2013 period was valid also for the previous years.  
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Table 6  
Number of employees in the active care of the selected hospitals and its share in total, 2010–2013 
(task-based approach) 
Employee 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
yearly average  
 Employee 
Doctor 6 794 7 060 6 769 7 138 
Other health professional 22 846 24 309 24 047 25 521 
Other employee 18 886 17 781 20 894 17 429 
Total 48 526 49 150 51 710 50 088 
 Share in total (%) 
Doctor 14.0 14.4 13.1 14.3 
Other health professional 47.1 49.5 46.5 51.0 
Other employee 38.9 36.2 40.4 34.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note. Here and in the tables hereafter, the deviations from 100.0 or from the total result from rounding.  
Source: Statistical reports on employment and wages in the health care sector. 
Table 7 
OC stocks as a percentage of total compensation  
of employees in the selected hospitals, 2010–2013 
Approach 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Title-based  2.48 3.75 3.86 4.33 
Task-based  11.24 11.98 11.27 12.34 
Source: Own calculations based on reports to the State Treasury and on statistical reports to the State Sec-
retariat for Health of the Ministry of Human Resources on employment and wages in the health care sector. 
Concerning the size of OC stocks, there are considerable differences between the 
two approaches, which seem, at first glance, hardly acceptable. The OECD study 
(Squicciarini–Le Mouel [2012]) estimates for the US at the national level an about 
twofold difference between occupations included in title-based and task-based ap-
proaches, but inpatient health care is an exception. Figure 4 in the OECD study 
(Squicciarini–Le Mouel [2012] p. 22.) shows that in the US, the largest difference 
between managers and other organisational occupations occurs in the health care – 
their ratio may be even larger than the ones in our study. Nevertheless, the broad 
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classification of occupations applied by hospitals in public Hungarian health statis-
tics is not really appropriate to select the staff contributing to OC creation. If a more 
specified categorisation were available, the coverage of the staff engaged in OC gen-
eration could be restricted. 
Table 8  
OC investment in the selected hospitals and in their active care, 2010–2013 
(title-based approach) 
Year 
Selected hospitals Active care of the selected hospitals 
Clinical General Total Clinical General Total 
million HUF (2010 price level) 
2010 1 676.8 433.1 2 109.8 1 180.1 304.6 1 484.7 
2011 1 841.7 478.2 2 319.8 1 305.8 338.8 1 644.6 
2012 2 023.5 528.4 2 551.9 1 435.6 375.0 1 810.6 
2013 2 256.8 593.1 2 849.9 1 618.1 426.0 2 044.1 
Note. Investment rate: 20% of the real compensation of managers. 
Source: Own calculations based on reports to the State Treasury. 
Table 9  
OC stocks in the selected hospitals and in their active care, 2010–2013 
(title-based approach) 
Year 
Selected hospitals Active care of the selected hospitals 
Clinical General Total Clinical General Total 
million HUF (2010 price level) 
2010 1 892.2 487.2 2 379.5 1 332.4 342.8 1 675.3 
2011 3 166.2 770.5 3 936.7 2 247.4 546.6 2 793.9 
2012 4 239.9 990.7 5 230.5 3 010.8 703.9 3 714.7 
2013 5 224.7 1 187.5 6 412.2 3 745.9 853.1 4 599.0 
Note. PIM: the investment rate is 20% of the real compensation of managers. The depreciation rate is 30% 
for clinical managers and 40% for general managers, using a geometric profile. 
Source: Own calculations based on reports to the State Treasury. 
In the title-based approach, OC stocks showed a sharp increase (on average, 
35.3% per year) between 2010 and 2013, but, according to the task-based method, 
the growth was much more moderate, only 12.6% annually. The difference may be 
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partly explained by the fact that the institutional reorganisation during the examined 
period could affect heavily the number of managers and less the coverage of the 
complete professional staff as such. 
The volume levels of investment and stocks of OC are presented in Tables 8–10. 
The figures compiled at hospital level have been adjusted to active care proportional-
ly to the cost shares financed by health insurance. 
Table 10 
OC investment and stocks, total earnings and number of employees in the active care  
of the selected hospitals, 2010–2013 
(task-based approach) 
Year 
Investment in 
OC 
OC stocks Total earnings 
Employees in 
active care 
Investment in OC 
/ total earnings 
OC stocks / total 
earnings 
million HUF head % 
2010 5 368 11 920 106 018 48 526 5.1 11.2 
2011 5 715 12 867 107 426 49 150 5.3 12.0 
2012 7 121 14 841 131 696 52 622 5.4 11.3 
2013 8 124 17 029 138 019 50 088 5.9 12.3 
Note. The investment rate is 9% of the real compensation of medical doctors and 6% of that of other pro-
fessional staff. PIM: the depreciation rate of OC stocks is 35%, using a geometric profile. Data on employment 
and earnings refer to the employees in active care. 
Source: Own calculations based on the reports of the State Secretariat for Healthcare of the Ministry of 
Human Resources on employment and wages.  
3. Measuring the impact of OC on hospital performance 
As it is widely accepted, capital input is proportional to the volume of stocks. We 
measure the impact of OC on hospital performance with the correlation between 
OC stocks and hospital output. In the basic specification, hospital output has been 
measured by the case-mix index multiplied by the number of cases.  
The core model specification is the following:  
it it it it n nit itY α β L γ M πINT δ Z e        , 
where itY  denotes the level of services provided by hospital i in year t; itL  is the 
labour input measured by the number of employees; itM  is intermediate input (pur-
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chased materials and services); itINT  refers to the stocks of own-account OC (both 
in the title-based and in the task-based approaches; in some title-based model vari-
ants, we distinguished clinical executives and general managers); nitZ  are control 
variables (i.e. number of beds in active care, average length of stay in active care, 
age of patients over 70, share of females in the total number of patients, GDP per 
capita by counties, and unemployment rate by counties). Such as in the German 
model (Schulz–Beckmann [2016]), the level of service output is measured by the 
product of multiplying the number of activities/cases and the case mix index of the 
hospital. This kind of output measure is correct mainly in a cross sectional analysis. 
However, any changes in the weights attached to various DRGs may distort the com-
parisons in time series. (The secondary output of own-account OC is not included in 
the specification.) 
The general characteristics of our variables are the following: 
The variables are specified in levels: the level of hospital performance is ex-
plained by the amount of labour input, other running costs and the services provided 
by own-account OC. (Control variables are expressed in various units of measure-
ment.) 
All inputs recorded in values have been deflated to 2010 price level. A GDP de-
flator has been applied for all variables.  
While (DRG-based) output/performance figures refer to active care, input data 
are relevant to the total costs of the hospital. For instance, we know the number of 
managers of a health care institution, but we do not know the number of managers 
working in its active care. To eliminate such differences, we have divided the input 
figures proportionally, using the cost shares financed by NHIF. (NHIF reports how 
much was spent on financing active care, long-term care, outpatient care, etc. at hos-
pital level.)  
If variables are specified in levels, the size effect influences heavily the signifi-
cance of the estimates. To counterbalance the size effect, all output and input varia-
bles have been normalised by the number of beds in regression analysis. Both the 
dependent variable and predictors (except control variables) have been divided by 
the number of beds in active care (or the number of DRG cases). 
Output has been adjusted by the hospital mortality rate. 
4. Results 
In the following, we present the 2010–2013 results of our cross sectional and 
pooled data regression analyses.   
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4.1. Cross sectional regression analysis  
Correlations between OC stocks and total clinical output. It is evident that 
OC stocks are strongly positively correlated with the clinical performance, indicating 
that larger hospitals having larger staff are providing a larger volume of care. In the 
2010–2013 period, the Spearman coefficient of correlation was over 0.72 in the title-
based approach and over 0.95 in the task-based approach. 
When the size effect was eliminated, and both OC stocks and output active care 
were normalised (divided by the number of activities/cases or by the number of 
beds), the results have been less clear-cut. Applying the task-based approach, we 
could detect a moderate, positive correlation between the volume of OC stocks and 
that of hospital output. Further investigations are required to find a conceptually 
justified way to separate the impact of labour input and that of own-account OC. 
Table 11 
Spearman rank correlation between OC stocks and total clinical output, 2010–2013 
Year 
Title-based, normalised OC stocks in active care Task-based, normalised OC stocks in active care  
by number of DRGs by number of active beds by number of DRGs by number of active beds 
2010 –0.378 0.124 0.277 0.551 
2011 –0.387 0.116 0.279 0.561 
2012 –0.349 0.204 0.357 0.527 
2013 –0.373 0.022 0.262 0.489 
Note. Data are normalised by the number of DRG cases or by the number of active beds. 
Source: Here and in the following tables, own calculations. 
In the title-based approach, no positive correlation could be detected between the 
volume of OC and that of hospital output. This is, however, not surprising in the 
Hungarian health care as it is widely known that the Hungarian DRG points under-
finance the DRGs of complicated, serious interventions. To manage departments 
performing such interventions, more executive capabilities are required, but this is 
not recognised in the points by which the output is evaluated. 
Correlation between OC stocks and clinical output measured with cases of com-
plicated interventions and the treatment of serious diseases. The distortion in the 
system of points used as weights to value clinical output may be a reason why no 
positive correlation can be found between OC stocks and clinical performance in the 
title-based approach. To eliminate this distortion, DRGs with more than two points 
have been selected, assuming that this set of activities covers the most complicated 
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interventions and treatments of serious diseases. We refer to this subset of activities 
as complex cases and presume that they can be only treated in teamwork, in which 
usually executives are empowered to instruct team members. The organisation of 
such teamwork is considered part of the investment in OC.  
To eliminate size effect, both OC stocks and the costs of performance have been 
normalised, divided by the number of DRGs (with over two points). In this version, 
the title-based OC indicates a moderate positive correlation with the selected perfor-
mances. If the connection between complex activities and task-based OC is measured 
in a similar way, positive correlation can be proved only in that case when the figures 
are normalised by the number of beds in active care.  
Table 12 
Spearman rank correlation between OC stocks and clinical output measured  
with cases having high DRG points, 2010–2013 
Year 
Title-based OC normalised  
by the number of DRGs  
Task-based OC normalised  
by the number of active beds 
2010 0.290 0.420 
2011 0.341 0.380 
2012 0.371 0.437 
2013 0.347 0.354 
Results of the regression model. To reveal the explanatory strength of predictors, 
first we have calculated pairwise the Pearson coefficients of correlations between 
clinical performance and explanatory variables. Two basic variants are presented in 
Table 13. In variant A, all variables (except control variables) are normalised, divid-
ed by the number of DRGs (at hospital level). In variant B, the number of beds in 
active care is used to transform variables to a normalised form. As our dataset cannot 
be treated as a random sample, the results of the significance tests indicated in the 
correlation tables may be ignored (Wasserstein–Lazar [2016]). 
The results show that both labour input and material costs are significantly corre-
lated with clinical performance normalised either by the number of activities/cases or 
by the number of beds. In variants A and B, not the same control variables proved to 
be significant. As already mentioned, if clinical performance is measured by the sum 
of all DRGs, weighted with the points as financed by the health insurance, the varia-
ble is not correlated with OC defined in a narrow sense. It indicates that the organisa-
tional work performed by executives and managers is not appreciated in the value 
fixed by the health insurance. Applying the broad, task-based definition for OC, 
significant correlation with clinical performance can be proved in each year. Howev-
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er, in this case the relatively strong correlation between labour input and OC can 
cause a problem. (The Pearson coefficients are between 0.518 and 0.601.) 
Table 13  
Pearson’s coefficients of correlation between clinical performance and explanatory variables, 2010–2013 
Explanatory variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Variant A: Variables are normalised by cases 
Clinical performance / cases 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Labour input in active care / cases 0.266 0.268 0.206 0.264 
Material costs in active care / cases 0.655 0.605 0.682 0.681 
Title-based approach: OC in active care / cases –0.282 –0.265 –0.236 –0.220 
Task-based approach: OC in active care / cases 0.303 0.297 0.374 0.301 
Active beds 0.715 0.708 0.768 0.710 
Average length of stay  –0.039 –0.050 0.031 0.004 
Proportion of female patients  –0.626 –0.594 –0.626 –0.698 
Proportion of patients aged 70+  –0.233 –0.231 –0.175 –0.164 
Unemployment rate –0.122 –0.166 –0.204 –0.173 
GDP / capita 0.261 0.194 0.275 0.287 
Variant B: Variables are normalised by the number of active beds 
Clinical performance / active beds 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Labour in active care / active beds 0.588 0.553 0.407 0.532 
Material costs in active care / active beds 0.703 0.661 0.609 0.669 
Title-based approach: OC in active care / active beds 0.109 0.109 0.288 0.039 
Task-based approach: OC in active care / active beds 0.470 0.458 0.494 0.375 
Active beds 0.568 0.538 0.385 0.534 
Average length of stay  –0.395 –0.411 –0.302 –0.400 
Proportion of female patients  –0.297 –0.245 –0.147 –0.393 
Proportion of patients aged 70+  –0.259 –0.290 –0.119 –0.273 
Unemployment rate –0.164 –0.250 –0.202 –0.176 
GDP / capita 0.389 0.349 0.352 0.369 
The cross sectional regression analysis shows similar findings. (See Tables 14 
and 15.) 
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Table 14 
Coefficients of the cross sectional regression analysis, 2010–2013  
(title-based OC stocks) 
Variable 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
B β  B β  B β  B β  
Variant A: OC is normalised by cases 
(Constant) 0.696 – 0.477 – 0.508 – 0.716 – 
Labour in active care / DRG cases  0.084 0.096 0.015 0.021 0.002 0.003 0.079 0.080 
Material costs in active care / DRG cases  0.101 0.336 0.099 0.341 0.111 0.377 0.120 0.341 
OC in active care / DRG cases  –0.017 –0.041 –0.016 –0.041 –0.019 –0.047 –0.021 –0.053 
Active beds 0.000 0.367 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.378 0.000 0.371 
Average stay in hospital  –0.006 –0.034 –0.012 –0.068 –0.017 –0.103 –0.017 –0.093 
Proportion of female patients  –0.017 –0.291 –0.016 –0.272 –0.019 –0.307 –0.018 –0.279 
Proportion of patients aged 70+  0.000 0.011 0.000 –0.001 0.002 0.051 0.000 0.002 
Unemployment rate  0.001 0.017 –0.002 –0.040 0.000 –0.003 –0.001 –0.013 
GDP / capita  0.000 0.099 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.154 
Variant B: OC is normalised by the number of active beds 
(Constant) 3.027 – 3.298 – 1.808 – 3.026 – 
Labour in active care / active beds  0.373 0.319 0.194 0.187 0.234 0.206 0.462 0.347 
Material costs in active care / active beds  0.081 0.192 0.077 0.183 0.152 0.358 0.113 0.232 
OC in active care / active beds  0.021 0.037 0.025 0.044 0.109 0.214 –0.068 –0.122 
Active beds 0.000 0.435 0.000 0.434 0.000 0.419 0.000 0.385 
Average stay in hospital  –0.076 –0.285 –0.104 –0.367 –0.068 –0.270 –0.109 –0.416 
Proportion of female patients  0.000 0.004 0.003 0.034 0.008 0.089 0.006 0.065 
Proportion of patients aged 70+  0.000 –0.007 –0.003 –0.066 –0.001 –0.013 –0.001 –0.012 
Unemployment rate  0.002 0.029 –0.008 –0.124 –0.006 –0.082 0.001 0.015 
GDP / capita  0.000 0.155 0.000 0.125 0.000 –0.001 0.000 0.282 
Note. Here and hereafter, B denotes unstandardized coefficient, and ß indicates standardized coefficient. 
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Table 15 
Coefficients of the cross sectional regression analysis, 2010–2013  
(task-based OC stocks) 
Variable 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
B β  B β  B β  B β  
Variant A: OC is normalised by cases 
(Constant) 0.628 – 0.410 – 0.492 – 0.681 – 
Labour in active care / DRG cases  0.083 0.095 0.009 0.013 –0.009 –0.012 –0.018 –0.019 
Material costs in active care / DRG cases  0.104 0.346 0.102 0.351 0.109 0.372 0.126 0.359 
OC in active care / DRG cases  –0.015 –0.025 –0.007 –0.011 0.016 0.028 0.072 0.115 
Active beds 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.395 0.000 0.406 0.000 0.400 
Average stay in hospital  –0.004 –0.025 –0.011 –0.062 –0.018 –0.106 –0.019 –0.107 
Proportion of female patients  –0.018 –0.301 –0.016 –0.276 –0.018 –0.291 –0.017 –0.266 
Proportion of patients aged 70+  0.001 0.016 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.049 0.000 –0.012 
Unemployment rate  0.000 0.009 –0.002 –0.053 –0.001 –0.026 –0.004 –0.064 
GDP / capita  0.000 0.094 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.06 0.000 0.074 
Variant B: OC is normalised by the number of active beds 
(Constant) 3.224 – 3.563 – 2.439 – 2.741 – 
Labour in active care / active beds  0.342 0.292 0.139 0.134 0.164 0.145 0.345 0.259 
Material costs in active care / active beds  0.073 0.173 0.065 0.153 0.136 0.321 0.129 0.266 
OC in active care / active beds  0.067 0.079 0.135 0.156 0.254 0.286 0.017 0.016 
Active beds 0.000 0.423 0.000 0.423 0.000 0.355 0.000 0.418 
Average stay in hospital  –0.080 –0.298 –0.108 –0.382 –0.085 –0.335 –0.105 –0.400 
Proportion of female patients  0.001 0.016 0.006 0.061 0.015 0.167 0.005 0.051 
Proportion of patients aged 70+  –0.001 –0.016 –0.004 –0.071 –0.001 –0.029 –0.001 –0.027 
Unemployment rate  0.002 0.036 –0.009 –0.131 –0.007 –0.102 –0.002 –0.028 
GDP / capita  0.000 0.151 0.000 0.079 0.000 –0.076 0.000 0.229 
4.2. Pooled data regression analysis  
To increase the number of observations, regression analysis has been carried 
out using pooled data. We have focused only on the task-based OC. The coefficient 
of OC stocks is positive in both variants, but there is a significant difference in its 
levels. The impact of OC on hospital performance is larger in the case of the 
B variant (see Table 17), when the number of active beds has been used for nor-
malisation. 
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Table 16  
Model summary – Task-based OC normalised by cases, 2010–2013 
Model R R2 Adjusted R2 
Standard error  
of the estimate 
All variables* entered in a single step 0.866(a) 0.749 0.736 0.072286 
* Variables: Predictors (constant), Labour in active care / DRG cases (log), Material costs in active care / 
DRG cases (log). OC in active care / DRG cases (log), Active beds, Average stay in hospital (days), Proportion 
of female patients (%), Proportion of patients aged 70+ (%), Unemployment rate (%), GDP / capita (HUF), 
Year 2010, Year 2011, Year 2012. 
Table 17  
Model summary – Task-based OC normalised by the number of active beds, 2010–2013 
Model R R2 Adjusted R2 
Standard error  
of the estimate 
All variables* entered in a single step 0.853(a) 0.727 0.712 0.115403 
* Variables: Predictors (constant), Labour in active care / active beds (log), Material costs in active care / 
active beds (log), OC in active care / active beds (log), Active beds, Average stay in hospital (days), Proportion 
of female patients (%), Proportion of patients aged 70+ (%), Unemployment rate (%), GDP / capita (HUF), 
Year 2010, Year 2011, Year 2012. 
Table 18  
Pooled data regression coefficients, 2010–2013  
(task-based OC stocks) 
Variable B β  
Variant A: OC is normalised by cases 
(Constant) 0.556 – 
Labour in active care / DRG cases  0.011 0.014 
Material costs in active care / DRG cases  0.109 0.357 
OC in active care / cases  0.007 0.014 
Active beds 0.000 0.380 
Average length of stay   –0.012 –0.067 
Proportion of female patients  –0.018 –0.305 
Proportion of patients aged 70+  0.001 0.017 
Unemployment rate  –0.001 –0.023 
GDP / capita  0.000 0.078 
Year 2010 –0.001 –0.003 
Year 2011 0.006 0.017 
Year 2012 0.013 0.041 
(Continued on the next page) 
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(Continuation) 
Variable B β  
Variant B: OC is normalised by the number of active beds 
(Constant) 3.128 – 
Labour in active care / active beds (log) 0.216 0.189 
Material costs in active care / active beds (log) 0.102 0.232 
OC in active care / active beds (log) 0.115 0.149 
Active beds 0.000 0.385 
Average length of stay (days) –0.097 –0.361 
Proportion of female patients (%)  0.004 0.044 
Proportion of patients aged 70+ (%) –0.002 –0.034 
Unemployment rate (%) –0.003 –0.045 
GDP / capita (HUF) 0.000 0.107 
Year 2010 0.027 0.054 
Year 2011 0.026 0.053 
Year 2012 0.051 0.103 
5. Summary and conclusions 
This Hungarian case study measures own-account OC following two approaches. 
According to the narrow title-based approach, only employees being in execu-
tive/managerial positions produce OC, while the broad task-based approach assumes 
that all employees may perform tasks in course of which OC is created to different 
degrees, depending on the content of the task.  
In order to provide a comparable and plausible size of OC in both approaches, it 
was assumed in the task-based approach that employees spend less time doing organ-
isational work. In the title-based method, we have applied CHS recommendations 
and measured investment in own-account OC as 20% of the compensation of execu-
tives/managers. In the task-based approach, it was assumed that doctors spent 9%, 
other health professionals 6% of their working time on creating OC. These ratios, 
however, are not specific to Hungary because they are based on the corresponding 
German research (Schulz–Beckmann [2016]). 
Our database consists of 58 general hospitals having comparable data for the pe-
riod of 2010–2013. Almost three quarters of the active care beds have belonged to 
these hospitals.  
The research has first estimated OC stocks in both approaches, which showed 
considerable differences: in 2013, the OC stocks were nearly three times higher in 
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the case of the task-based approach than in that of the other one. At the same time, 
the value of OC stocks came up to about 12% of the compensation of all employees 
in the selected hospitals. 
After estimating OC stocks, we have analysed the impact of OC on the clinical 
performance of hospitals. Several cross sectional statistics have been compiled. In 
the task-based approach, we could identify a slight positive correlation between 
OC stocks and the overall clinical performance; however, no positive correlation 
could be found in the title-based approach. We assume that better results would be 
achieved, if the clinical performance variable put more value on DRGs of complicat-
ed interventions and the treatment of serious diseases. Measuring clinical perfor-
mance with DRGs over two points, a moderate positive correlation could be found 
between OC stocks and clinical performance. 
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